Sharing budgetary austerity under free mobility and asymmetric information : an optimal regulation approach to fiscal federalism In the present article, Tiebout meets Laffont and Tirole in the land of Fiscal Federalism. We use a non-trivial Principal-Multi-Agent model to characterize the optimal intergovernmental grant schedule, when the cost of local public goods depends on hidden characteristics and actions of local governments, and under citizen free mobility. We show that local governments earn informational rents, and how optimal local taxes, public good production levels and land prices are jointly distorted at the second-best optimum, as a consequence of free mobility and asymmetric information. The effect of informational asymmetries is to decrease the average production of public goods and to increase the inter-jurisdictional variance of taxes and public-good production.
Introduction
Since Tiebout's (1956) seminal work, the extent to which citizens'free mobility helps mitigating ine¢ ciencies in the allocation of local public goods has been studied in various contexts 1 .
In the present article, Tiebout meets La¤ont and Tirole 2 in the land of Fiscal Federalism 3 .
We study a non-trivial Principal-Multi-Agent problem in which the Principal is a central government, the Agents are local governments, and in which citizens are free to move from one jurisdiction to the other. In each jurisdiction, there is a land market, the local government chooses a local tax, and the production level of a local public good. Local governments are rent and reelection-seeking politicians, with a clear incentive to pump out money from the central government. Any change in local public policies may trigger population movements, changing local tax revenues, and therefore local de…cits. The central government's policy objective is to minimize the cost of transfers to local governments-i.e., the total sum of grants -plus any …nancial costs or interest charges associated with public de…cits, subject to the local governments'individual rationality constraints, and subject to the constraints of a free-mobility equilibrium. This de…cit minimization problem is shown to be equivalent to maximization of the sum of local governments'utilities, and characterizes optimality in a certain sense. We study this problem under asymmetric information: the center cannot disentangle the impact of unobserved local conditions and unobservable cost-reduction efforts of the local government on the cost of local public goods. We analyze the second-best optimal contract, called the "internal stability pact", in this Principal-Multi-Agent setting.
The solution gives an optimal grant function, as well as local production levels and tax rates.
Our approach thus combines elements of Political Economy with optimal regulation theory. By Political Economy, we mean that the local governments'objectives do not try to maximize the citizens'welfare, but maximize instead a politician's utility function in which reelection probability and rents enter as arguments. In addition, we study a benchmark variant of the model in which local governments are benevolent welfare maximizers. Finally, our central government has no aversion for inequality, and thus no redistribution motive: we 1 For a recent survey of the literature on local public goods, see Scotchmer (2001) . 2 See La¤ont and Tirole (1986) , (1993) . 3 See the classic contribution, Oates (1972) , and for a more recent survey of the …eld, see Oates (2004) .
2 therefore isolate a pure e¢ ciency problem.
Our results can be summarized as follows. In the complete information case, we derive the optimal grant schedule, in both the "Political Economy" and "Welfare Maximization" variants of the model. The …rst-order conditions for this problem form a complex system of integral equations, that can be solved analytically in the linear-quadratic case. We discuss the meaning of these equations and then focus on the linear-quadratic case, in which the optimal grant can be fully derived. Optimal local public-good productions, taxes, costreduction e¤orts, and land prices are decreasing functions of the jurisdiction's marginal cost type; the optimal grant schedule is a cost-reimbursement rule that leaves a zero rent to all local governments. If citizens are made more mobile, the inter-jurisdictional variances of taxes and public productions do increase. Comparison of the "Political Economy" with the "Welfare Maximization" solution shows that the two variants are in fact qualitatively very similar.
Under asymmetric information, the central government can observe local unit costs of production, but cannot disentangle the contribution of "natural" conditions (i.e., the type), from the e¤ect of cost-reduction e¤orts. A higher type corresponds to a higher marginal cost of production, ceteris paribus. There is a continuum of possible local conditions, or types, described by a given probability distribution. Incentive compatibility requires the payment of an informational rent, which is decreasing with type, to all local governments, except the least e¢ cient one. All local governments contribute to de…cit reduction e¤orts (i.e.,
share "budgetary austerity"), and not only those who run a de…cit. Second-best optimal local productions and taxes are decreasing functions of the jurisdiction type (in fact of the "virtual type"), with joint distortions of taxes and productions. The e¤ect of informational asymmetries is to reduce average production, and to increase the variance of both local productions and taxes. The citizen's average utility is smaller under asymmetric information, as compared to the complete information benchmark. The results obtained are very di¤erent from the case of immobile consumers, in which the model boils down to a standard PrincipalAgent model. In the free-mobility case, there is a distortion "at the top" (i.e., for the most e¢ cient jurisdiction), and local taxes are distorted too. The interplay of taxes, land prices and public good productions is more subtle in the case of free mobility.
Relationship with the literature
In a recent survey of Fiscal Federalism, Oates (2004) , describes the evolution of the …eld, since the early classic work, as a progressive synthesis using elements coming from other literatures. The theory had …rst to react to its Public-Choice school critics, and had to amend or remove the government benevolence assumptions used in the classic normative approaches 4 .
In the past decade, concepts and techniques from information economics, the theory of incentives and the theory of the …rm, have been imported in the …eld. Important recent work poses the problem of the optimal degree of decentralization; see for instance Gilbert and Picard (1996) , Lockwood (2002) , Besley and Coate (2003) , La¤ont and Zantman (2002) 5 .
The theory of the …rm and more particularly, the theory of incomplete contracts, has been applied to the question of decentralization; see J. ; Seabright (1996) .
Finally, Principal-Agent theory has been a source of inspiration for a number of recent papers devoted to decentralization and …scal redistribution in a federation, or a multi-jurisdictional model; among other contributions, e.g., Persson and Tabellini (1996) income and taste for public goods. They perform an optimal tax analysis of this economy and show that second-best optimal redistribution is limited by informational problems. Bucovetsky et al.(1998) consider again the optimal subsidy problem in a federation in which members di¤er by their preferences for public goods, when local governments rely on capital income taxation. They show that distortions in both the allocation of capital and the production of public goods are the result of the center's incomplete information. Ra¤ and Wilson (1997) consider the income redistribution problem between regions in 4 For a survey of these approaches, see Inman and Rubinfeld (1997) . 5 These papers o¤er various theories of the trade-o¤ between centralization and decentralization.
4 the presence of mobile workers, when the local productivity of work, which is not observed by the center, depends on some public e¤ort (costly public inputs) which is also unobservable.
Lockwood (1999) studies an inter-regional optimal insurance problem, in which risk-averse regions are subject to privately observed random shocks of various types. He studies optimal grants when there are public-good spillovers between regions, and shows the existence of a "two-way distortion" of public production, i.e., there can be oversupply as well as undersupply with respect to the …rst-best production rule, depending on the value of the shock.
Cornes and Silva (2002) study the optimal interregional redistribution problem when the cost of providing local public goods is the di¤erence between an unknown type and unobserved local government e¤ort; they …nd analogous results: distortions of both cost-reducing e¤orts and local public good production.
As compared to the articles cited above, the present contribution considers the optimal grant problem in the case of a continuum of unobservable jurisdictions types, combined with perfectly mobile citizens, local land markets, and …scal externalities due to population migrations. This gives rise to a genuine Principal-Multi-Agent model, and, as far as we know, this has not been done before. Ra¤ and Wilson's (1997) pioneering work considers worker mobility, but only two types of jurisdictions, with no interdependent land or real estate markets, and no …scal externalities. Cornes and Silva (2002) and Lockwood (1999) have analyzed a Principal-Agent model in the continuum-of-types case, but with immobile representative consumers. A study of the continuum-of-types model is of course useful, to the extent that it allows a better understanding of the optimal grant function's properties, with a realism that the illustrative two-types case doesn't possess. In addition, our (relatively) simple model has a normative, (i.e, welfare maximization) and a "positive" (i.e; "Political Economy") variant, that can easily be compared.
We think that La¤ont and Tirole's (1986) model is well-adapted to study the problem delineated above. Budgetary e¤orts, whether they take the form of (local) tax increases or of reductions in local public good production, are unpopular. The vote maximizing behavior of local politicians will lead them to exert a sub-optimal level of de…cit-reduction e¤ort, from the central government's point of view. The central government's ability to provide correct incentives to local governments essentially depends on the information it possesses, and this 5 can vary form one country to the other. In many countries, the central government levies local taxes on behalf of local authorities, who vote on local tax rates. Due to this particular form of organization (tax collection monopoly of the center), the central government is necessarily endowed with many pieces of information (on local tax rates, tax bases, and budgets) and can try to curb local public expenditure via its grants to local public authorities. Due to the fact that local budgets are public information, the center observes total cost, as well as the quantity of public goods produced locally, but cannot distinguish which part of the cost can be attributed to e¤ort and which part depends on hidden local conditions: this precisely corresponds to La¤ont and Tirole's (1986) model of optimal regulation under asymmetric information, that we adapted to our setting.
Our analysis has been motivated by the desire to study the internal consequences of EU agreements for euro-zone states, which is one among several other possible applications.
The new budgetary rules established by the Maastricht Treaty, strengthened by the "Growth and Stability Pact", compel each euro-zone member state to a national de…cit-reduction policy 6 To enforce budgetary discipline, the Treaty of Amsterdam speci…es a number of mechanisms, both preventive and repressive, leading to …nancial penalties imposed on the faulty member state's central government.
An internal incentives problem stems from the fact that de…cit and debt ratios apply to the consolidated budget of all public administration bodies, including central and local governments, whereas central authorities only are held responsible for violations. Without a mechanism for explicitly sharing the e¤orts made to curb de…cits, local public administrations would conduct tax and budget policies without taking their impact on global de…cits into account. To abide by the terms of European commitments, central governments should then design and implement coordination mechanisms, with the power to internalize budget externalities, and to ensure local budget policies' overall compatibility with national objectives.
In the following, Section 2 describes the model, the agents' utility functions and the land markets. Section 3 analyzes the central government's optimization problem under 6 Compliance with budgetary rules can be assessed by comparing consolidated public de…cits with reference ratios: public de…cits must remain below 3 % of GNP and public debt must not exceed 60 % of GNP. 
The model
The economy consists of a State, run by a central government (also called the "center"), and a large number of local jurisdictions, with the same level in the hierarchy of public authorities, and administered by local governments (also called the Agents). Local governments represent citizen's preferences in a certain sense, to be made precise below. A local public good, …nanced through local taxes and grants from the center, is produced in each jurisdiction.
Local public goods do not generate inter-jurisdictional spillovers. In each local jurisdiction, there is a land (or real estate) market. Citizens "vote with their feet", and select the jurisdiction with the best bundle of local public goods, taxes and land prices. Any citizen moving in a given jurisdiction must buy (or rent) a piece of land (or a house) of nonzero size.
The local governments'types
Local jurisdictions di¤er only in a cost parameter , hereafter called the local "type". The population of jurisdictions is described by a probability distribution of type , the density of which is denoted f ( ), with c.d.f F ( ) and support ; . Parameter captures various local characteristics which remain imperfectly observed by the central government, like geographical relief, geological aspects, local market conditions for production inputs, etc.
Let q denote the quantity of a public good produced locally; its total production cost
, where a denotes the local government's cost-reducing e¤ort, and k is an increasing, di¤erentiably convex function of q that doesn't depend on . This cost of production doesn't depend on the number of consumers. In many countries, the central government has many pieces of information relative to local authorities' accounts, insofar as local budgetary documents are transmitted to the central administrative services, or publicly disclosed, and because the (central) Public Treasury acts as a tax collector, on behalf of the local governments. We then assume that the central government knows k and always observes C and q ex post. It follows from this assumption that the unit cost c( ) = C=q k(q)=q = a is observable. It also follows that e¤orts would be observable, if types were observable, for then a = c( ). We also suppose that the center knows the local tax revenues.
Under asymmetric information, the center cannot decompose the local marginal cost into its type and e¤ort components. An e¢ cient local jurisdiction can pose as an ine¢ cient one by exerting low e¤ort. We assume that e¤ort is costly for local governments. Denote (a) the e¤ort cost function; we assume that this function is continuously di¤erentiable with
The citizens'utility function and free mobility equilibrium
Let N ( ) denote the number of inhabitants in a jurisdiction of type . There is a continuum of citizens. The total mass of citizens in the country is assumed …xed and normalized to one (without loss of generality). The following constraint thus holds:
(provided that N is integrable, of course). From the point of view of citizens, jurisdiction is characterized by a land price p( ), a level of local public good production q( ) and a local tax t( ). All citizens are assumed identical for simplicity. If a citizen chooses to settle in jurisdiction , he or she chooses a quantity of land x, so as to maximize the quasi-linear utility function,
where u and v are continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and concave functions. Due to the additive structure of utility, the demand for land is characterized by the …rst-order necessary (and su¢ cient) condition v 0 (x) = p. We assume that there is one unit of land in each jurisdiction, it follows that in land market equilibrium, we must have N ( )x = 1 in each jurisdiction, or
The indirect utility of a citizen, located in a type jurisdiction, can therefore be rewritten,
where by de…nition,
It is easy to check that Z is decreasing (and invertible). Citizens being assumed identical and free to move from one jurisdiction to the other, there is a utility value u, such that in free mobility equilibrium, for all ,
The local governments'objective function
The central government pays a grant T ( ) to each local jurisdiction. Each jurisdiction chooses a local (per capita) tax t ( ). Then, the number of inhabitants N ( ) is the local tax base, and t ( ) N ( ) is the local tax revenue. From the point of view of the local government, local public good production has utility S(q) and the local tax has an additively separable disutility (t), where S and are di¤erentiable, strictly increasing functions, with S 00 < 0 and 00 > 0.
The local government's utility is …nally de…ned as follows:
There are two possible interpretations of this utility. If it is viewed as the local politician's objective, we get a model with a Political Economy ‡avor: (t) is then the disutility of taxation for the politician, who fears that increasing local taxes might decrease his (her) reelection probability, and by the same token, he or she values local public goods, insofar as they increase his (her) electoral support. The rest of the expression is a rent, that is, the di¤erence between total …nancial resources T +tN , and total costs ( a)q +k(q)+ (a), expressed in money units, that the local politicians can use in various ways for campaigning, to curry favour with some groups of citizens, …nance extravagant expenditures, etc.
If S(q) is interpreted as social utility for the public good, and (t) represents the social costs of local taxation, the same utility can be interpreted as a normative, Utilitarian objective, aggregating the local citizens' preferences over local public goods. Under this second, normative interpretation, the budget surplus T + tN ( a)q k is viewed as redistributed to citizens in one way or another, and can be simply rede…ned as (t; N ) = tN + '(t). We can also set S = N u(q) + N Z(N ) to connect local government surplus and the citizens'real total surplus. A mix of the two interpretations is also legitimate, given that the scale of S, and can be adjusted to represent various weightings of money rents and the utility of local public policy (q; t; a).
The e¤ort cost also supports several interpretations; it can represent the real cost of resources involved in improving e¢ ciency, including the wages and bonuses paid to those who exert e¤ort, and (or) it can be viewed as the aggregate private disutility of local civil servants, politicians, and possibly other citizens involved. We assume here that does not appear as a cost in the public budget, which points to an interpretation in terms of private costs of cost-reduction e¤orts.
Local jurisdictions have a clear incentive to pump out money from the central government. The presence of S (q) and (t) can lead local powers to run a de…cit as part of an optimal policy. There is no explicit budget constraint at the local level: local governments can freely run de…cits. These de…cits are …nanced by local public debt, reimbursed by future generations of local taxpayers. The local taste for rent will however limit the extent of de…cits.
We …nally assume that local jurisdictions cannot be forced to sustain arbitrarily large penalties, in the particular sense that utility V cannot fall below a "reservation" level V , for all type . Let IR ( ) denote this participation, or individual rationality constraint, i.e. V V . This can again be interpreted in various ways. It can represent the politicians reservation utility, under which politicians prefer to resign and surrender the local rights of control to the central government. In some countries, bankrupt towns fall under the direct supervision of central government prefects, and therefore cease to exist as independent local authorities. Another interpretation is that constitutional rights forbid the central government to exploit local communities or districts arbitrarily.
The central government' s objective function and de…cits
To simplify notation, we will use the expectation operator E each time there is an integral with respect to type . More precisely, if h is any integrable function of , in the following, we denote,
We assume for simplicity that the central government's expenditure is limited to the total sum of grants to local governments (introducing national taxes and national public goods in the model would not add anything essential). The central government's budget de…cit can thus be expressed as E(T ), where the expectation represents the total sum of transfers to local governments. Given the terms of an international treaty, the central government is committed to keep consolidated public de…cits, denoted D, below a given amount D. The consolidated de…cit of central and local governments can thus be computed as follows,
If D > D, in other words, if the consolidated de…cit is above the limit, we assume that the central government pays an …nancial charge r per unit of excess de…cit. A possible interpretation is that the central government is …ned by a supra-national authority. The amount of penalties is de…ned as
where r 0. Local governments running a de…cit exert a negative externality on the central government, whereas those who maintain a surplus exert a positive externality. We will focus on the interesting case in which D > D, or P (D) > 0. Remark that P (D) may represent the …nancial and social costs and (or) the crowding-out e¤ects of public debt. Parameter r can also be interpreted as the interest on public debt, or as the Lagrange multiplier of the Public authorities'intertemporal budget constraint.
The central government's utility, denoted W , is de…ned as follows:
This is tantamount to assuming that the center minimizes the total sum of grants and …nancial costs on de…cits. 
E(T ) r(D D)
subject to, for all type , 7 Note that the central government maximize their own utility, not the sum of the local constituencies' utilities. A typical strategy of the central government is to transfer attributions to local governments without transferring their full counterpart in terms of resources, thus freeing resources at the center that can be invested in the central politicians' reelection. The center's objective can thus also be interpreted as maximization of reelection probability, insofar as this probability is increasing with respect to central budget "surplus" (i.e., money that can be used in a discretionary way by the center). A limit of this simple model is of course that votes in favor of the central politicians can depend on the citizens'utility for local public goods, and on the amount of local taxes: voters can hold central politicians responsible for forcing local politicians to cut spending or raise local taxes. Our model could easily be extended to account for these e¤ects by adding terms to W . A variant could for instance add a term of the form, E(V );where represents the weight of the local politicians'utilities in the central politician's objective function.
where to simplify notation,
and T = T ( ). It is not di¢ cult to check that the constraints IR( ) will hold as equalities at the optimum. If the constraint was slack for some non-negligible subset of types, then the center could reduce transfers on a non-negligible set of types, and spare money. The center leaves no rents to local governments. We therefore get,
We then substitute this expression in the central government's objective function. After some easy algebra, the center's utility boils down to:
which is equivalent to maximizing the sum of the local governments'utilities, once …nancial costs (or de…cit penalties) are shared proportionally. This maximization problem is equivalent to that of a perfectly informed, central politician who adds all local interests together with an equal weight. In addition, all local governments will share the de…cit penalties on an equal footing 8 . Remark that r can be interpreted as the cost of public debt (if D = 0).
This central government's objective should be maximized, subject to the constraint that the country is in free-mobility equilibrium.
Necessary conditions for optimality under free mobility
To solve this problem, remark that, Z being a decreasing, di¤erentiable function, it can be inverted, and given that in free-mobility equilibrium, Z[N ( )] = u u(q( )) + t( ) for all , we get,
for all , where it is implicitly understood that N is a function of parameter u, to be determined in equilibrium. To simplify notation, denote
The equilibrium value of u is determined by the constraint,
For given functions q( ); t( ), there is a unique value of u that solves the above equation, because n is monotonic.
The central government's optimum problem is thus to maximize,
with respect to q(:); a(:); t(:); and u, subject to (16). Introducing a constant Lagrange multiplier for the population constraint, a standard method yields the …rst-order necessary conditions for an optimal contract (i.e., the "internal stability pact") between the central government and the local governments. Taking derivatives under the expectation operator with respect to q; t; a for each , and with respect to u, and rearranging terms, yields the following four conditions,
where of course n and n 0 are functions of the argument z = u u(q) + t. Solving the …rst equation (i.e., (18)) gives e¤ort a as a function of q for each type. The second and third conditions (i.e., (19) and (20)) then jointly determine t and q as a function of and u.
The value of is given by (21), and the value of u is …nally pinned down by the population constraint (16).
The interpretation of these optimality conditions is relatively easy. Equation (18) says that the optimal value of e¤ort equates the marginal local disutility of e¤ort with its marginal, 14 cost-reduction value (1 + r)q in each jurisdiction. This cost-reduction value naturally takes the marginal cost of excess de…cits into account (i.e., it depends on r). Multiplier is the marginal value to the central government of one additional citizen in the country. Equation (21) says that must also be equal to the average of local tax revenue losses due to mobilityinduced …scal-base changes n 0 , following a unit raise of u (i.e., E(tn 0 )=E(n 0 ) > 0). This term is multiplied by (1 + r), to take …nancial costs into account. Expression (19) says that at the optimum, the value to local government of increasing local public good production by one unit must be equal to marginal cost (1 + r)(c + k 0 ), minus the tax base gains due to immigration in local jurisdiction , i.e., (1 + r)tn 0 u 0 < 0, plus the social cost n 0 u 0 in ‡icted to all other jurisdictions by the fact that dN = n 0 u 0 > 0 citizens would leave their jurisdiction to come to . Equation (20) has a parallel interpretation and says that following a unit increase in local tax dt = 1, the value of local tax revenue gains (1 + r) n must equal the marginal social cost of local taxation 0 plus the net marginal cost of migrations out of jurisdiction , i.e., [(1 + r)t ]n 0 > 0. Again, the Lagrange multiplier appears to re ‡ect the fact that citizens who leave jurisdiction will increase the number of taxpayers and tax revenues in other jurisdictions, which must be taken into account by the central government.
Note …nally that (19) and (20) together imply the unusual condition,
If citizens are immobile, and uniformly distributed among jurisdictions, then n 0 = 0 and n = 1 everywhere, so that optimality conditions boil down to 0 (t) = (1 + r) and S 0 (q) = (1 + r)(c + k 0 (q)): the tax rate and land prices are the same in every location, but, since c = a is not a constant, local production varies from one jurisdiction to the next.
This results in an unequal situation, in which citizens would like to move, if they were able to.
The system of equations (16), (18)- (21) is very hard to solve, because, due to citizens' free mobility, all optimal local policies are interdependent. Given that the expression of involves the integral of a function of q( ), and t( ), we get a system of integral equations,
that cannot be solved with the help of standard algebra and calculus, except in a few special cases. One such case is when the functions involved are linear-quadratic, so that their …rst 15 derivatives are linear. To get a more complete understanding of the structure of central optima in our model, we now turn to the analysis of the linear quadratic case.
The linear-quadratic case
Assume …rst that the utility of land has the following hyperbolic shape,
where > 0 is a parameter. Then, it is easy to check that Z is linear, i.e.,
so that …nally we get n 0 = . Assume in addition that S(q) = sq with s > 0 (note that adding a quadratic term to this speci…cation would not lead to a really more general setting, because k will be assumed quadratic). Given that citizens have the same preferences for public goods, without much loss of generality, we can assume that u is linear, and that q is expressed in utility units, that is u(q) = q. We …nally assume that all cost functions are quadratic: (t) = ('=2)t 2 , (a) = ( =2)a 2 , and k(q) = (c 2 =2)q 2 where ', , c 2 > 0.
To simplify notation further, denote q = E(q), t = E(t). Then, with this standard model, it is easy to see that equation (21) yields = (1 + r)t. Equation (18) yields a( ) = (1= )(1 + r)q( ). Then, the system of two equations (19) and (20) becomes linear, that is, after some rearrangement and substitution of (18) and (21), we get,
't + (1 + r)(t t) = (1 + r)(u q + t):
The total population constraint (16) can now be rewritten,
Taking the expected values of (25) and (26) and solving for the optimal values (q ; t ), we get, after some simpli…cations, Result 1.
It is obvious that q will be positive if at the same time, s is large enough with respect to the mean value of (which is a natural condition, for otherwise, the optimal production of local public goods could be zero, in some jurisdictions at least), and k is convex enough, that is, c 2 > 1 + r. We then immediately derive the equilibrium value of u from (27) as follows, u = q 1= t . With these results (that we were able to obtain only because the model is linear-quadratic), we can rewrite (25)-(26) as follows,
(1 + r)() [' + 2 (1 + r)](t t ) = 0:
This system has a unique solution, stated as Result 2, below. Straightforward algebra yields:
Result 2. Let q , t denote the optimal solution under complete information, then,
In addition, as a corollary,
and …nally,
Now, the interpretation of these results depends on the sign of the system determinant .
Result 3. If and c 2 are large enough, then, there exists an r such that if 0 r < r, then > 0, and as a result, more ine¢ cient (i.e. high ) jurisdictions produce less, exert less e¤ort, and tax less than e¢ cient (i.e. low ) jurisdictions. Formally,
A consequence of this result is that balanced-budget rules imposed on local governments are not optimal.
How does the optimal grant look like? It is de…ned with the help of q ( ), t ( ), and expression (12), that is,
This optimal grant function leaves no rents to local governments, whichever their type, so that V = V for all . This will no longer be the case under asymmetric information. Finally, the utility of citizens is (by de…nition of free mobility equilibrium) the same everywhere, i.e. U = u, for all , but the price of land is not the same everywhere, i.e.,
Taking the derivative with respect to , we get,
In the linear-quadratic framework, we get a decreasing price function, provided that > 0, as in the statement of Result 3 above; i.e., since v 00 < 0,
As a consequence, the more e¢ cient the jurisdiction, the more densely populated.
We can …nally discuss the impact of the degree of citizen mobility. This degree is parameterized by . When goes to zero, the price of land becomes extremely sensitive to migrations, and as a result, citizens become immobile. When = 0, Result 2 shows that taxes are the same everywhere. We can also show the following Result, the proof of which is straightforward.
Result 4. The variances of local public good production and of local taxes are increasing functions of the degree of mobility ; formally,
Implementation of the optimum under complete information
It is now easy to implement the optimum under conditions of complete information, provided that the central government has a reliable estimation of . The central government can subject all local governments to an incentive transfer schedule e T , depending on e¤ort, production, local taxation, and population, which should be de…ned as follows,
where M ( ) is an appropriate function, not depending on a, q, t. It is not di¢ cult to check that, when subjected to transfer e T , each local government chooses t( ), q( ) and a( ) so as to satisfy the …rst order conditions (18)- (20). The term M ( ) must be chosen so as to leave a zero rent to each type local government, once they have chosen the optimal values of e¤ort, production and tax. The …rst term in the expression of e T internalizes the vertical budget externality due to the existence of …nancial penalties, the second term internalizes the social cost of siphoning o¤ the neighbor's tax base.
The normative, benevolent-planner case
We now derive the optimal solution in the normative version of the model, assuming that local governments want to maximize the total sum of their residents'utilities. To this end we simply change the analysis as follows: as indicated above, it is su¢ cient to set = N t+'(t), and S = N u(q) + N Z(N ). With these changes, the central government's objective becomes,
But the free-mobility equilibrium condition yields u(q) t + Z(N ) = u for every citizen.
Thus, the central government should maximize,
subject to the constraint E(n) = 1, where n is de…ned by (14)- (15) above. Let denote the Lagrange multiplier of the constaint. The …rst-order conditions for optimality can be 19 derived as before; we get the following four conditions:
Note that conditions (19), (20) and (21) have changed. The local government's cost of taxation is now "endogenized". The marginal surplus terms are n 0 u 0 u and ' 0 n 0 u for production and taxation respectively, given that the economy must be in free-mobility equilibrium. We can now solve this system in the linear-quadratic case, exactly as speci…ed above, assuming in addition that '(t) = (1=2)' 0 t 2 , with ' 0 > 0. We get the following results.
Result 1B.
Remark that q > 0, if and only if (1 + r)E( ) < 1. This is a natural consequence of the normalization u(q) = q: the marginal utility of the public good is constant and equal to 1, so that, intuitively, average optimal production can be positive if the average marginal cost term (1 + r)E( ) is below 1 (we assume that the solution is interior). We get a regular, interior solution only if ' 0 > 0, as can be seen from (29b). Note that ' 0 has no reason to be equal to ', which makes numerical comparisons with the Political Economy case less straightforward. Some algebra yields Result 2B.
Result 2B. Let q , t denote the optimal solution under complete information, then,
where 
Internal Stability Pact under Asymmetric Information
We can now start the study of the optimal internal stability pact under asymmetric information. The central government cannot observe and a directly, but observes t, C and q, or equivalently, observes t, c = C=q, and q. Given that is not observed by the center, the value of e¤ort a cannot be deduced. As in La¤ont and Tirole (1986), the second-best optimal contract with local governments is a screening, self-selection mechanism, based on transfer formulae, i.e., in this context, it is an incentive grant schedule. We exclude the possibility of collusion among the numerous local governments.
We will rely on the Revelation Principle, saying that under asymmetric information, a direct revelation mechanism can do as well as any other, indirect, non-revealing mechanism, from the Principal's point of view.
A direct revelation mechanism (or internal stability pact) is an array of functions 
Incentive compatibility
Let b V ( b ; ) denote the utility of a type local government if they report that their type is b :
where c( b ) is the required level of e¤ort when posing as a type b , and by de…nition,
the utility of a truthful local government.
The internal stability pact (T ( b ); c( b ); q( b ); t( b )), is revealing if and only if
There is an in…nity of revelation or incentive compatibility constraints.
We …rst show that this in…nity of constraints is equivalent to a pair of simpler constraints.
To this end, we rely on a fundamental Lemma, which is an adaptation of a well-known result in the Theory of Incentives (e.g., La¤ont and Tirole (1986), La¤ont and Martimort (2002) ).
Lemma: The revelation constraints are equivalent to the following two conditions: for all
For the sake of completeness, we provide a proof of this result in the Appendix.
The central government' s second-best optimum problem
The central government must now solve the following problem:
for all , and the population constraint
Since V ( ) is a non-increasing function of , the participation constraint IR( ) holds if and only if it holds for the highest type, i.e., V ( ) 0. Integrating IC 1 ( ), yields the expression of the local government's informational rent, that is,
The central government would like to pay the smallest possible amount of rent. It follows that V ( ) = V . Remark then that the most ine¢ cient local government has a zero rent. Since 0 > 0, the other local government types receive an informational rent which is decreasing with . Note that the rent of type is also increasing with the e¤orts of types 0 .
We now express the transfer T ( ) as a function of other variables; this yields,
Denote the rent of type , as r( ) = V ( ) V . The average rent R paid by the central government is by de…nition R = E(r). Using integration by parts 9 , we get,
We then substitute the expressions for transfer and rent in the central government's objective function. After some straightforward simpli…cations, the center's optimization problem becomes,
where a( ) = c( ), subject to the constraints c 0 ( ) 0, and E(N ) = 1. Remark that if we de…ne the function,
the problem of …nding the second-best optimal taxes, e¤orts, and local productions is the same as before, if we replace with in (17), that is, the center should simply maximize,
subject to E(n) = 1, and c 0 0. To solve this problem, we …rst neglect the constraint on c 0 , write the …rst-order optimality conditions, and check that IC 2 holds afterwards. It follows that the …rst-order necessary conditions for a second-best optimal contract between the central and local governments can be written as (18)- (21) above, provided that is used instead of . The only change is that (18) must now be written,
where a ( ) ; q ( ) ; t ( ) ; denote the second-best optimal solution.
We can express the (second-best) optimal incentive grant schedule, denoted T , as follows,
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Result 5. If c 0 0 holds for all types, then, all local governments such that < enjoy informational rents at the optimum. The second-best optimal grant schedule is given by the following formula:
We need to check that c 0 0 holds: we will do it later. To study the distortions induced by informational asymmetries without having to deal with the complex threedimensional comparative statics of the second-best solution, and again to clarify the exposition, we will focus on the linear-quadratic case 10 (as de…ned in the preceding section).
We can recycle Results 1 and 2, with some di¤erences due to the change in the condition determining e¤ort (i.e. (18) becoming (50)), to derive the second-best optimum.
For convenience, denote
We can state the following.
Result 6.
The only change in the expression of average production is that the mean type E( ) has been replaced by the mean virtual type E(h + ). Remark that, using integration by parts,
and hence E( + h) = . Having solved the …rst-order conditions for the average values of q and t, we solve the complete system for the secondbest optimum a ( ) ; q ( ) ; t ( ); using the same logic as above, straightforward algebra yields the following.
Result 7. Under asymmetric information, assume that the second-best optimal solution is interior (i.e. a; q; t > 0 for all ), then, we get,
where is de…ned as in Result 2 above, and …nally,
Again, we …nd that the di¤erences between …rst-best and second-best are entirely due to the replacement of types , by Myerson's virtual types 11 , i.e., + F ( )=f ( ).
Consider now the function c ( ) a ( ). We must check that this function is non-decreasing. Remark that, using Result 7,
where 0 = 1 [' + 2 (1 + r)]. It is standard to assume in the literature on incentives, that h 0 > 0, or equivalently, that f =F is a decreasing function. We can therefore state the following result.
Result 8. Assume that the second-best optimal solution is interior, then if > 0, and 1 + h 0 0, the monotonicity condition IC 2 ( ) (i.e., c non-decreasing), holds for every .
The impact of informational asymmetries
The second-best solution leads to the unusual conclusion that distortions occur at both ends of the type interval. To see this, compute,
11 See Myerson (1981) .
We also get,
It is not di¢ cult to check that there is a distortion "at the top", formally,
Result 9. If > 0, there is a positive distortion at the lower end of the cost-type scale,
i.e., the most e¢ cient jurisdiction exhibits overproduction, as compared to …rst-best, and in addition,
the most e¢ cient jurisdictions exhibit over-taxation 12 .
Under the conditions of Result 8, we can try to summarize the di¤erences between complete and asymmetric information as follows.
Result 10. Assuming that > 0, the average second-best local public-good production q is smaller than the corresponding …rst-best average q . The average second-best local tax t is the same than the …rst-best average t , i.e.,
and if h 0 ( ) 0, both taxation and local public good productions have a greater variance under asymmetric information:
Proof. The statement relative to expectations in Result 10 is an immediate consequence of Result 6. To obtain the property of increased variances, note that, using Results 2 and 6, V ar(t ) = 
where 1 = 1 (1 + r) . Since h 0 0, we have Cov( ; h) 0, and thus V ar(h) + 2Cov( ; h) 0, which yields the desired result for the variance of local taxes. The same reasoning, mutatis mutandis, yields the desired result concerning the variance of production.
Q.E.D.
We conclude that the presence of asymmetric information worsens the situation for the citizens belonging to ine¢ cient (high ) jurisdictions. Informational asymmetries increase the variance of taxes, keeping the average tax constant, and simultaneously decreases average production and increases the variance of the public good production. It then seems that the inequality among citizens increases as a consequence of informational asymmetries. But does the average utility level decrease? To see this precisely, let u denote the …rst-best utility level of citizens and u denote the second-best utility level. Then, we must have,
with a similar expression for u . Since E(N ) = 1 in either case, we get the following result.
Result 11. The citizens' average utility level is lower under asymmetric information than under complete information, formally,
The utility loss is entirely due to the decrease of public production on average, and the average e¤ects of other factors (i.e., land prices and taxes) cancel each other.
At the same time, local politicians will be able to consume more rent in every constituency, except the least e¢ cient ones. E¤ort distortions aim at reducing the cost of rents for the center: under asymmetric information, the internal stability pact is therefore the result of an optimal trade-o¤ between informational rents and cost-reducing e¤orts. A powerful incentive scheme would push e¤orts to their …rst-best optimal levels, but would bleed the central government's budget white. Note that the analysis does not provide a standard result: this is due to free mobility. If citizens were immobile (and uniformly distributed among jurisdictions), the second-best structure would be more transparent, and would be exactly analogous to the solution of a Principal-Agent problem à la La¤ont-Tirole (1986): all second-best optimal e¤ort levels would be distorted downwards as compared to …rst best, and as a consequence, all second-best production levels would be distorted downwards, except for the most e¢ cient jurisdictions, and local tax rates would be undistorted. The originality of the present approach comes from the interaction of local taxation and citizen mobility, more precisely from the presence of horizontal …scal externalities induced by mobility. Local taxes, productions, e¤orts, and land prices are made interdependent in a non-trivial way, and what would otherwise have been a standard Principal-Agent model becomes a non-standard Principal-Multi-Agent structure.
Implementation of the internal stability pact under asymmetric information
We can use the Taxation Principle 13 , to show that the internal stability pact (T ( b ); c ( b ); q ( b ); t ( b )) (which is a direct revealing mechanism), is equivalent to a nonlinear grant G (c), joint with a production requirement Q (c), and a local tax requirement (c). This shows that the notion of type-reports of local governments to the center is more or less formal, since in fact, each government will choose in a menu c 7 ! (G (c) ; Q (c) ; (c)), depending on its observable marginal cost only.
Since c ( ) is a strictly increasing function, it can be inverted. Let then = (c) (c ) 1 (c) be this inverse function. We de…ne the non-linear grant function as, G (c)
T ( (c)). And de…ne Q (c) = q ( (c)); (c) = t ( (c)). When faced with this menu of choices, type chooses c so as to get c = a ( ).
Remark that the optimal solution does not really admit a decentralized choice of local taxes by local governments: each local government will be asked to choose in a menu, which determines the grant G, the local production Q, and the local tax rate simultaneously as a function of the observed unit cost c. Local jurisdictions are free in principle to choose their local tax, but the optimal incentives system will drive every rational local government to choose the second-best rate t . Standard Principal-Agent, optimal regulation theories do not provide a justi…cation for genuine …scal decentralization -at least not is this simple 13 Again, see La¤ont and Martimort (2002) . 29 model.
Conclusion
We have studied the optimal contract linking a central government to local governments, under conditions of asymmetric information, when the aggregate de…cit of the public sector must be reduced, due to …nancial costs or penalties. The problem is to understand how budgetary austerity will be "shared" with local governments, when governments are motivated by re-election perspectives and rents. Our results rely on optimal regulation theory, applied to a Principal-Multi-Agent framework. Due to the interdependence of jurisdictions through citizens'migrations, the solution obtained is not formally that of a standard Principal-Agent problem. We characterize the shape of the second-best optimal grant schedule, when the cost of local public goods depends on unobservable characteristics and "e¤orts" of the local government. The second-best optimal production of local public goods and local tax rates are jointly distorted. The most e¢ cient (low cost) jurisdictions produce more, tax more, experience higher land prices and attract more inhabitants than the less e¢ cient (high cost)
jurisdictions. Informational asymmetries increase the variance of both local tax rates and local productions of public goods, and the average utility and local public good production decreases, with respect to the complete information benchmark.
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6 Appendix
Proof of the Lemma.
The optimal report of an agent solves M ax b b V ( b ; ). The …rst-order necessary condition @ b V ( b ; )=@ b = 0 can be rewritten,
Truthful revelation implies that the above relation holds for b = , and we get :
for all . We now compute, 
And substituting the necessary condition for truthful revelation we …nd IC 1 ( ), that is, We have proved that the local conditions IC 1 and IC 2 are su¢ cient for revelation. Q.E.D.
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